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This article analyses political role of madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan from a historical 
perspective to see how they have played key roles in shaping political and strategic agendas of state 
and non-state actors in South Asia. Consequently, this undertaking adopts the historicist approach 
in which it will emphasise the importance of madrasa history in order to understand historical 
changes and demonstrate their potential role as tool to exert political and strategic interests of state 
and non-state actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It argues that although madrasas are generally 
considered as centres for Islamic religious education, their roles vary amongst countries with 
different forms of social, cultural, and political structures. This paper concludes that in countries 
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan - under the tense political and strategic pressure of regional and 
international powers - where Islam depicts social, cultural, and political identities of Muslims, some 
madrasas play a key role as potential tool to exert political and strategic interests of state and non-
state actors. 
 




INTRODUCTION   
 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US), books, articles 
and magazines written on the subjects of Islam and madrasa occupied the shelves and desks of 
Western and non-Western scholars, politicians and strategists. The conviction that the 11 
September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) terrorists attack were carried out by Muslim radical militants 
attracted the world’s, and especially the West’s, attention to the religion of Islam and its role in 
Islamic societies. Moreover, people in the Western and non-Western world started questioning 
and debating about any possible link between madrasas and terrorism. Notably, in the context 
of accusing madrasas as being centres for training radical religious terrorists, the first analysis 
coming from the media (particularly Western) which identified madrasas as a threat to 
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international security (Berkey, 2007, p. 40; Henfer, 2007, p. 1; Zaman, 2007, p. 61). 
Nonetheless, debates on madrasas are not unprecedented; indeed, since the Western domination 
in the fields of education, politics and international affairs, there has been ongoing debate 
amongst Muslim scholars on the role of madrasas in Islamic society, particularly on the issues 
of reform and modernization of the traditional concepts, methods and principles of Islamic 
pedagogy. 
 This article focuses on changing role of madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, in 
relation to the way in which some madrasas have become politicized to serve policies and 
strategies of state and non-state actors. In order to support this argument, this undertaking will 
look at what is meant by madrasa and what kind of role do madrasas generally play in the 
Islamic world. It will then follow with assessing on what kind of impacts did British colonial 
rule have on the traditional roles of madrasas in the Indian subcontinent and how have madrasas 
responded to Western supremacy in knowledge, science and international affairs. Following 
this it will examine whether madrasas reserve their de facto importance as surrogates in proxy 
warfare, as they did during the Cold War, in Pakistan and Afghanistan or have reinstated their 
traditional role as education centers will be addressed in later part. Here it is important to note 
that in this article madrasas disregard gender differences (male or female madrasas) and refer 
to all those institutions that provide Islamic religious education. 
This undertaking is based on analytical research framework. It will primarily use 
secondary source of literature. The most important reason for relying on secondary literature is 
due to historical analysis of the changing role of madrasas in the Islamic world. This is 
important to understand how madrasas, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, played key 
role motivating political movements and violence and also in shaping the strategies and policies 
of states throughout history. Consequently, this paper adopts the historicist approach in which 
it will emphasise the importance of madrasa history in order to understand historical changes 
and demonstrate their potential role in politics and violence. 
 
MADRASAS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD: BACKGROUND 
 
For any significant discussion on madrasas, one must understand what is meant by madrasas 
and also must have knowledge of their historical context in Islamic society. Thus, it is important 
to give a sort of Islamic epistemological understanding and historical background of the 
madrasa before analysing its role in the contemporary Islamic world. Islamic epistemology is 
based upon the Quran and Sunnah (Prophet’s tradition). Explaining the importance of the 
religious ontology, tenets, and Islamic worldview, Seyyed Hussein Nasr, Professor of Islamic 
Studies, George Washington University, in an interview with Journal of Religion - Adyan, 
stated that “religion in its universal dimension and… teachings provides crucial help in gaining 
…total reality of the natural environment and…help us… solve… crisis at hand (Nasr, 2013, p. 
9). He further elaborated that the very existence of the universe and “its very detail … [is] sign 
that God has placed in nature precisely to help us to remember him” (Nasr, 2013, p. 8). 
According to Diallo (2012, p. 175), Islamic epistemology, in practice and theory, “remained 
intrinsically tied with Islamic education tradition.” However, this does not mean to say that 
Islamic education is merely based on religious curriculum; rather, in addition to religious 
subjects, madrasa curriculum includes Arabic language (semantics, literature, poetry, 




morphology) and science subjects (astronomy, anatomy, botany, meteorology, logic) (Diallo, 
2012, p. 176). In the context of Islamic epistemology, the very existence of the universe, 
knowledge and philosophy is rooted in the divinely inspired scripture of Quran. According to 
the Quran, it is a guide for people, “hudan lin nas”, (2:185). 
The term madrasa is derived from the Arabic word darsa, meaning lesson. Technically 
madrasa means centre of education or school. According to Manjurul Haque, the glossary 
definition of madrasa is the “place at which the act of imparting lesson is performed” (Haque, 
2103, p. 11). In the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the term madrasa is defined in both modern and 
medieval usage. The term madrasa in medieval usage referred to mainly religious college of 
law, whereas, in modern usage, it refers to colleges or higher institutions where subjects of 
Islamic science are taught (Bearman, et al., 2000, pp. 231-232). However, in respect to modern 
usage of the term madrasa, there are different perceptions between Arab and non-Arab Islamic 
countries. In the Arab world, including Iran, which is a non-Arabic nation, the term madrasa is 
applied for both general and/or religious educations. In non-Arabic countries, particularly in 
South Asia, the term madrasa refers to institutions that impart religious education. Given the 
fact that Muslims practice compulsory religious duties, far’d al-ayn, and sunnah, on a daily 
basis, such as praying five times a day, fasting for one month during Ramadan (the 9th month 
in the Islamic calendar), and performing funeral prayers and so on, there is a requirement for 
each Muslim to have basic religious knowledge. Thus, even in most of the taught curricula in 
general education in the Islamic world, there is at least one compulsory subject of Islamic 
studies, Islamiyat (Islamic studies) that imparts basic Islamic knowledge. For example, the 
national curriculum in Pakistan includes one compulsory subject of Islamic studies in primary, 
middle, secondary and higher secondary education (Nordic Recognition Information Centres, 
2006, pp. 9-10). In the same way in Afghanistan, the national curricula comprise one 
compulsory subject of Islamic studies, diniyat, theology (Samadi, 2001, pp. 40-45). In addition 
to basic religious knowledge, these subjects, Islamiyat, or diniyat, instruct students how to read 
and recite the Quran. 
Traditionally, Islamic religious and non-religious education were not separated as 
different institutions, in fact they existed as one institution. However, there were two forms of 
knowledge in madrasa education, “the transmitted (naqli or manqul) and rational (aqli or 
maqul)” (Sikand, 2008, pp. 43-51). The naqli or manqul imparted Quran exegesis, ahkam – ul 
– Quran (legal content of Quran), hadith and fiqh. On the other hand, aqli or maqul dealt with 
mostly non-religious and scientific studies, such as mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, 
letters, semantics and poetry. In relation to the ways in which early madrasas taught these 
subjects, Hefner (2007, p. 6) stated that the pedagogies in early madrasas were performed in 
informal study circles known as halqa, (circle) which took place under the supervision of 
shaykhs (scholars) in places such as madrasas, mosques and/or private homes. Nonetheless, it 
is important to note that the halqa method of pedagogy has remained as one of the most used 
ways of instruction, particularly in present Afghan and Pakistani madrasas. 
Throughout the history of the Islamic world, the Muslim leaders considered madrasas 
as a very important institution capable of changing the social and political character of an 
Islamic society. According to Henfer (2007, p. 8) “Kings, viziers, and…elites patronised 
madrasas to demonstrate their own high standing and to ensure that the message coming from 
the scholarly community remained friendly” (Henfer, 2007, p. 8). In fact, in the context of social 




structure, politics and religious ideology madrasas began to play an important role between the 
8th and 9th centuries. During this time, great Muslim theologians and philosophers such as 
Noman Bin Thabit (well known as Abu Hanifa) emerged who followed a different 
methodological analysis, interpretation of Quran and Sunnah, to traditionalists in Hijaz. Abu 
Hanifa relied on “Quran, the Sunnah…ijma (consensus), qiyas (analogical reasoning), istihan 
(legal preference), and al urf (custom) (Ramadan, 2009, p. 54). Iraqi scholars inspired by Abu 
Hanifa’s works followed his way of thought (Ramadan, 2009, p. 41). As a result, a new school 
of thought, known as Hanafi Mazhab, (Hanafi Sect), developed in the 8th century, which, 
according to Ramadan, was known as a school of opinion (ahl – al – ray), and was different to 
traditionalists who were led by Malik Bin Anas (better known as imam Malik) in Hijaz 
(Ramadan, 2009, p. 41). Madrasas in Iraq mainly followed Hanafi school of thought, whereas, 
in Hijaz, madrasas’ pedagogy was based on Maliki school of thought. Amongst the students in 
Hanafi and Maliki madrasas, Ahmed Bin Muhammad Bin Hanbal Abu Abdullah Al – Shaybani 
(better known as imam Hanbal), and Abu Abdullah Muhammad Bin Idris al – Shafi’I (better 
known as imam Shafi’i) emerged as well-known Islamic scholars and theologians who 
interpreted Quran and sunna under distinct school of thoughts, which influenced Muslim 
scholars in the Middle East, North Africa and became the third and fourth mazhabs, 
respectively. Throughout the early eras, particularly from the late 8th century onwards, 
madrasas played an important role in presenting legal diversity in Islamic law, dividing 
Muslims politically, socially and religiously under distinct sects. 
Diversity in Islamic law and jurisprudence expanded over time, particularly after 730, 
in that followers of distinct schools of jurisprudence competed to control the central political 
power in the Islamic empire (for example, there were a series of rebellions between Kharijiyah 
(those who first supported Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, authority, but later denied) and Shia in 
Mecca, Medina and Iraq) (Esposito, 1998, p. 17). Although, there were a series of revolts that 
changed the ruling powers from the Ummiyyads Dynasty, led by Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan, 
between 661-680, centred in Syria, to the Abbasid Dynasty (run from Baghdad, Iraq), Islamic 
geographies continuously expanded and Muslims relatively lived in peace, rituality, tolerance 
and quest for knowledge. Nonetheless, in the later period, particularly after the 17th century 
Muslims of different schools of thought, tribe and background fought for greater political 
power. The decline of the Islamic world and the emergence of a powerful West was a sign of a 
paradigm shift in international politics in the early 18th century. According to Esposito (1998, 
p. 43) the decline “reversed the relationship of the Islamic world to the West – from…expanding 
offensive movement to a defensive posture.” The Islamic world’s response to the Western 
domination was diverse, some decreed holy war, jihad, (for example, in the Indian subcontinent, 
Afghanistan) calling “cooperation with the West or adaptation of its culture as betrayal and 
surrender” while others followed the West in modernising their politics, law and education 
(Esposito, 1998, p. 44). 
It is important to emphasise that after the Western domination in international affairs, 
particularly in knowledge and advanced science, the educational reform in Islamic world took 
place in two ways. The Islamic states, such as Turkey and Iran that Western imperial powers 
had failed to colonise followed the Western model of education. For example, Sultan 
Abdülhamid II, the ruler of the Ottoman Empire from 1876 to 1909, merged the European 
model of educational programmes with the conventional Ottoman educational system (Islamic 




studies and Ottoman history) in Turkish madrasas (Henfer, 2007, p. 14). However, after the 
declaration of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
entire religious pedagogy was eliminated from general education (Henfer, 2007, p. 15). 
The rise of Western industrialisation, which started with the British Industrial 
Revolution in the 18th century (Dean, 1996, p. 14) not only transformed economies, societies 
and politics in Europe, but also, in respect to education, it was a paradigm shift that changed 
the centre of education and knowledge from the Islamic to the Western world. According to 
Phyllis Dean, the British Industrial Revolution was rooted in transformation of state power from 
totalitarianism (king, religious leader, Puritan, Catholic) to “English aristocracy”, which was 
known as the Glorious Revolution, which resulted in the establishment of a new form of 
government, in which decisions of national interest (economic, implementing legislation, 
waging wars) were taken by the House of Commons, an elected body (Dean, 1996, p. 20), not 
the king or a religious leader. This development detached religion from politics in Britain. The 
rest of Western Europe, such as France and Belgium, followed the British industrial path. By 
1913, states outside the European boundaries, such the US, Russia and Japan, had acquired 
industrial techniques and brought essential reforms to their constitutions in order to compete 
with the advanced European states (Frieden, 2007, p. 59). The revolution came with the arrival 
of the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent in the late 18th century. In this context, most 
of the Islamic nations failed to acquire technological advancement, particularly in restructuring 
and reforming political and educational systems. Nonetheless, some Islamic countries, such as 
Turkey and Iran, found educational backwardness and flaws as reason for their defeat by the 
advanced West. However, in countries such as India Muslims believed that “Muslim decline 
had been believers’ neglect of God’s law” (Henfer, 2007, pp. 17-19). 
The British colonisation of the Indian subcontinent, according Haque (2013, p. 12), 
meant the devastation of the “social, economic, cultural and emotional domain of Muslim 
communities [and in the context of education the reform in madrasa was the] bitter taste of 
change.” It is important to note here that the British control of the Indian subcontinent was not 
a bloodless transformation of power from Muslim rulers to English colonial powers. Rather, 
Muslim scholars and ulema attempted a failed revolt by decreeing jihad against the British 
occupying forces in 1857 (Noor, et al., 2008, p. 15). According to Henfer, this divided Muslim 
scholars into two groups and some started appealing to incorporate to “European arts, science, 
and etiquette [whereas others such as Ahl-i-Hadis, rejected to cooperate with the British] 
insisting that the only path forward was a…commitment to the law… of Quran and Hadith 
(Henfer, 2007, p. 19). For Muslim modernists in the Indian subcontinent, Islamic decline was 
“a sign that Islam was not being correctly understood and practiced” (Esposito, 1998, p. 55). 
To adapt to the new environment, madrasas were forced to “reorganise dramatically” (Bano, 
2007, p. 48). Those who incorporated with modern advanced European science adopted a 
Western style of education. For example, Sayid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) founded the 
Scientific Society in 1864 and established Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh 
1874, which was modelled on Cambridge University (later named as Aligarh Muslim 
University in 1920) (Esposito, 1998, p. 55). Further, Khan published Tadhib al-Akhlaq 
(Refinement of Conduct), which provided “modernist Islamic perspectives on a wide range of 
subjects” (Esposito, 1998, p. 56). 
 




In the same way, some reformists, such as Shah Wali Allah and Shah Abdul Aziz, who 
rejected medieval interpretation (Esposito, 1998, p. 90), formed a new madrasa under the 
British Empire, known as Dar –ul – Ulum, built in 1867 in Deoband town (today the madrasa 
is better known as Dar – ul – Ulum Deoband or Deobandi madrasa), in the Saharanpur district 
of Uttar Pradish India (Noor, et al., 2008, p. 15). Notably, one of the important madrasas that 
reorganised its pedagogy and curriculum based on the Western model was Nadwat – I – Ulema 
in Lucknow. According to Esposito, Nadwat – I – Ulema was one of the leading madrasas in 
India that “accepted British patronage and even tried to integrate Western discipline into their 
traditional Islamic curriculum” (Esposito, 1998, p. 90). However, it is important to emphasise 
that there was a distinction made during the colonial era between religious and non-religious 
education, the former known as “personal” and the latter as “public or general” education 
(Alam, 2002, p. 2124). According to Alam, the colonial judgement of religious school as 
personal resisted government control over madrasas; this kind of phenomenon served the 
interests of ulema as “they were able to engage in the hegemonic representation of the masses 
[and also provided madrasas with the authority to control or] exercise power and hegemony 
over Muslim masses in India” (Alam, 2002, pp. 2124-2126). Since then, once again, madrasa 
have started playing a greater role in Muslim communities in the Indian subcontinent. 
The Deobandi madrasas were, academically, the most important and politically the most 
significant in South Asia (Zaman, 2007, p. 63). Although, in a short period of time, Dar – ul– 
Ulum Deoband became one of the prestigious centres for Islamic studies with fast growing 
branches all across the Indian subcontinent, some Muslim scholars were opposed to adopting a 
Western system of education or importing a foreign syllabus into madrasa curriculum and 
remained opposed to reform based on two particularly important understandings. First, Ulema 
consider Islam “ultimate truth” and believe that madrasas had produced renowned scholars 
throughout history, thus, any reform is “regarded as sign of weak faith and …straying from the 
path that the elders of the past have trod”; second, they see reform “as interference in …their 
own territory” (Sikand, 2008, pp. 33-34). British colonial rule intensified already existing 
religious sectarianism amongst Muslims in South Asia. According to Zaman (2007, p. 63) “new 
Westernised Muslim elites were more suspicious of ulema than were the colonial officials, [and] 
ulema saw themselves as …religio-political leaders.” 
 However, Indian Muslims’ incorporation with the British waned with the incident 
wherein the British rulers destroyed a place used for ablutions before praying in the mosque in 
Kanpur in 1913 (Esposito, 1998, pp. 90-91). Some ulema propagandised the incident as “ Islam 
in danger” and decreed for jihad against British colonial rule (Esposito, 1998, p. 91). In addition, 
this incident amalgamated ulema of different schools of thought and madrasas along with 
Westernised Muslim elites to form a united political movement against the British Raj. Notably, 
in this regard, one of the first institutional supports came from the Jamiat i-Ulama – I – Hind 
(The Organisation of Indian Ulema) (Esposito, 1998, p. 92). Thus, in the context of the first 
political movements for Indian independence, it can be said that madrasas played a key role in 
political movements against British colonial rule. In other words, madrasas were important 
institutions for awakening and motivating Indian Muslims under religious rhetoric of 
advocating revival of a caliphate in the Indian subcontinent and defending Islam against British 
colonial oppression. 
 




However, after the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, madrasas became 
completely detached from Indian politics. A resolution passed by Jamiat i-Ulama – I – Hind 
and the first Education Minister of India, Abul Kalam Azad, a Muslim scholar and politician, 
declared that Muslim organisations, including madrasas, “would be religious, cultural and 
educational” (Metcalf, 2007, p. 92). In the absence of an Islamic state, madrasas preserved their 
autonomous states, fearing that any affiliation with and interference from Indian states would 
endanger the Islamic norms, culture and identity. Absence of official engagement resulted in 
the development of diverse schools of thought and Islamic orientations. According to Metcalf 
(2007, p. 94), most of the madrasas in India are linked to a distinct sect, such as Deobandi or 
Ahl – I Sunnat wa’l –Jama’at, Ahl – I hadith, Ahmadi, Ithna Ashari (Twelvers), and Ismailis. 
This is not to say that all madrasas are not unregistered, there are a few madrasas, particularly 
those that have adopted a modern system of pedagogy, such as Jamia Islamia in Varanasi, and 
some of the Ahl – I Hadith madrasas, that are registered under the Indian Board of Education 
(Metcalf, 2007, pp. 96-97). In present India, registered madrasas (registered with the Board of 
Education) pursue a similar general school syllabus alongside the religious pedagogy. Those 
students who want to continue with religious education enrol in Dar – ul – Ulums and Jamiyas 
(names applied to some higher religious institutions in some regions of India, such as Kerala 
(Metcalf, 2007, p. 98) and those who would prefer to continue with scientific non-religious 
education enrol at the universities. Although, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, madrasas in India, 
likewise in other Islamic countries around the world, attracted attention, particularly from the 
media, suspecting madrasas as centres for training jihad and Islamic terrorism, contemporary 
madrasas in India generally remained as institutions that provide basic education (religious and 
non-religious) with the aim to preserve Islamic identity and culture (Metcalf, 2007, pp. 91-100). 
  
ROLE OF MADRASAS IN PAKISTAN 
 
Religious language, symbols and slogans, such as “Islam in Danger’ and the traditional battle 
cry “Allahu Akbar” become an integral part of the Muslim League’s political ideology and 
rhetoric. Local religious leaders and mosques played an important role in bringing the mass of 
Muslim peasants and artisans into the Pakistan Movement (Esposito, 1998, p. 96). 
Prior to the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, madrasas remained a focal 
point of religio-political rhetoric to pursue political objectives for the Muslim politicians and 
religious leaders. It is important to note that Indian ulemas had not unanimously supported the 
notion of creating a separated nation state for Indian Muslims. Some Muslim scholars, such as 
Abul Kalam Azad, denounced the notion of nationalism, saying that it contradicts the idea of 
“Islamic universalism” (Esposito, 1998, p. 94). However, a fair number of the religious 
scholars, particularly from the Deobandi group, supported the political movement under the All 
India Muslim League to create an independent nation state for Indian Muslims. Finally, under 
a massive religio-political movement led by the Jamiat –e - Ulema – e – Islami, a separate 
Deobandi group that supported the Pakistan Movement, and the All India Muslim League, the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan was created as a nation state for Indian Muslims on 14 August 
1947. This phenomenon resulted in the newly independent Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
receiving a large number of Deobandi madrasas at the time of the Partition (Bano, 2007, p. 49). 
It is important to discuss the potential role and importance of religious identity, as well as the 




role of religious institutions, in the process of state building in the newly independent nation of 
Pakistan. In contrast to India, Pakistan’s religious scholars, ulema, preserved their de facto role 
in the politics, society and cultural identity of Pakistan. According to Esposito (1998, pp. 117-
118), religious leaders and secular politicians and policymakers debated for nine years to draft 
the first national constitution of Pakistan in 1956. Some of the remarkable provisions of the 
constitution were: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is based on Islamic beliefs, thus, the head 
of state must be a Muslim (Part IV, Article 32); reforming Islamic society under Islamic 
principles (Part XII, Article 97); and “no law contrary to Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet 
could be enacted (Article 198)” (Esposito, 1998, p. 118). 
Political and social identity in Pakistan developed alongside the power struggle between 
secular and religious parties. Pakistani modernists and seculars have always tried to establish a 
secular authority to govern the state. Notably, there were some attempts by Pakistani leaders, 
such as that by President General Ayub Khan (1958 – 1969) to reform the constitution, known 
as Constitution 1962, in which Islamic provision was omitted from the Republic of Pakistan 
(Esposito, 1998, p. 121) However, an angry backlash from the public, forced policymakers to 
redraft this as the Constitution of 1963 in which Islamic provision was restored (Esposito, 1998, 
p. 121). In the same way, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was the President (1971 – 1973), and later 
Prime Minister (1973 – 1977), of Pakistan attempted to control madrasa under reform initiatives 
in which non-religious subjects, such as English and mathematics, were supplemented in 
madrasa curriculum (Bano, 2007, p. 50: Zaman, 2007, p. 77). Although Pakistan had inherited 
its governing institution from British India, it failed to pursue a Westernised secular path. 
Notably in this context, the failed attempts to modernise Islam by Bhutto and Ayub Khan, the 
most influential leaders in Pakistan’s political history, and follow a secular path was an example 
that showed the potential role of religious leaders in Pakistan’s politics. According to Bano 
(2007, p. 50), the state of Pakistan avoided clashing with ulema, “who commanded respect 
within certain constituencies.” This phenomenon coerced political leaders to demonstrate 
political policy, and their party agendas, under religious justification. For example the Pakistan 
People’s Party’s (PPP) policies, such as nationalisation and land reform, were advocated in the 
religious language of “Musawat-i-Muhammadi (the Equality of Muhammad) and Islamic 
Musawat (Islamic Equality)” (Esposito, 1998, pp. 172-173; Mandaville, 2007, p. 170). This 
shows how madrasas and their affiliates, ulema and shaykhs, had established a strong cadre in 
legislation, policymaking and the political affairs of the country. Thus, in contrast to India, 
ulema and their associate madrasas have been playing a key role in building the culture, society, 
strategy and political identity of Pakistan. One of the important developments in this respect 
was the formation of the Islamic political parties, such as Jamiat – e – Ulema – e – Islam, and 
Jamiat – e – Ulema – e – Pakistan, which, according to Esposito, provided “organised outlets” 
for Pakistani ulema (Esposito, 1998, p. 120). Under a grand religious campaign led by JI against 
the secular Bhutto in the 1977 election, a united religious political movement called the Pakistan 
National Alliance was formed. Although Bhutto won the election, the religious rebellions 
demanding for “true Islamisation,” continued even after the elections (Mandaville, 2007, p. 
172). These religious movements fostered a bloodless martial law by the military in 1977. This 
part is important for the purpose of this paper, given the empowerment of Islamism, particularly 
in the context of the formation of hundreds of new madrasas under different schools of thought 
and their role in the domestic and foreign policies and strategies of Pakistan. 




General Muhammad Zia – Ul – Haq, who was appointed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the 
then Prime Minister of Pakistan, as Chief of Army Staff in 1976, was well known for his 
personal piety and strong affinity with Islam. In a military coup d’état in 1977, General Zia– Ul 
– Haq came into power in Pakistan. Under General Zia’s rule, Pakistan’s cultural, social and 
political identity transformed drastically. Moreover, Zia’s policies continuously influenced 
Pakistan’s society, culture, religion and politics over the coming decades. Zia’s doctrine, 
“System of the Prophet” or Nizam-i Islami (Islamic Order), attracted religious leaders, in 
particular JI, who zealously supported Zia’s Islamic agenda. Under Nizam-i Islami doctrine, 
Zia imposed some fundamental religious laws, such as Shari’ah Courts being formed to observe 
and verify whether the laws constituted were in accordance with Islam, such as Zakat (2.5 % 
tax) levied from all bank accounts in Pakistan; Islamic studies became mandatory at all levels 
of education (Esposito, 1998, p. 176; Mandaville, 2007, p. 172). According to Rizvi (2000, p. 
166), in press conferences and media interviews, General Zia clearly declared that “he would 
not hand over power as long as the mission of Islamisation and moral renewal of the country 
was not completed.” Ahmad Rashid, a renowned Pakistani journalist and author, finds Zia 
responsible for the present instability in Pakistan in his book, Descent into Chaos, he states 
[T]he militancy of the religious parties, the mushrooming of madrasas and extremist groups, 
the spread of drug and Kalashnikov culture, and increase of sectarian violence took place during 
the Zia era (Rashid, 2008, p. 38). 
Two important events in 1979, the religious revolution in Iran that brought religious 
leader Rohullah Moosavi Khomeini to power and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
transformed the fortunes of Zia’s regime overnight. The West turned a blind eye to Zia’s 
dictatorship, poor human rights record and his clandestine nuclear weapons programme, under 
the potential necessities of a Cold War strategy (Rashid, 2008, p. 39). The US Secretary of 
State, George Pratt Shultz, in his memo to President Reagan, wrote that 
President Reagan should “ endeavour to convince Zia of his personal interest in these 
concerns and his sensitivities to Zia’s view” Shultz added “We must remember that, without 
Zia’s support, the Afghan resistance, key to making the Soviets pay the price for their Afghan 
adventure, is effectively dead (cited in Coll, 2004, p. 62). 
As a result, Zia received carte blanch from the US to manoeuvre politics, and religion, 
including supplying arms to Afghan’s religiously motivated guerrilla fighters (Afghan 
Mujahedin) (Coll, 2004, p. 63). In addition, General Zia received $ 3.2 billion military and 
economic aid from the US (Rashid, 2008, p. 38). The religious support at home and 
international support under the Cold War politics led General Zia to seem, on the one hand, a 
close ally of the West and, at home, a charismatic strong leader. General Zia, along with the 
chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant-General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, 
choreographed a religious war, a so called Afghan jihad, against Soviet infidels. Under this 
plan, madrasas mushroomed, particularly along the Afghan borders. The madrasa curriculums 
“were designed to provide religious endorsement for armed struggle in the defence of Islam”, 
which led hundreds of thousands of Afghani and Pakistani students to participate in jihad 
against the Soviet and Afghan communist forces in Afghanistan (Zaman, 2007, p.71’ Ashraf, 
2012 p. 19). According to Coll (2004, p. 61), General “Zia embraced jihad as a strategy…[he 
considered] “the legions of Islamic fighters on the Afghan frontier…as a secret tactical 
weapon.” As a result, madrasas became a potential tool to exert the political and strategic 




interest of Pakistan and its Western allies during the Cold War strategies. Nonetheless, Pakistan, 
regardless of the Cold War politics, was using Islam as a tool for its Afghan foreign policy. 
Religiously motivated policy towards Afghanistan was a strategy led by Pakistan to distract the 
notion of Pashtun nationalism, which was a source of a protracted irredentist claim on Pakistan 
by Afghanistan. 
However, internationalisation of the jihad under the Cold War strategy, amplified the 
strategic impact of the West-supported Pakistani policy in which the religion of Islam was used 
through distinct madrasas to recruit radical Muslims from all around the world. According to 
Rashid (2001, p. 130), about 35,000 Muslim radicals from the Middle East, North and East 
Africa, Central Asia and Far East Asia came to join the Afghan jihad between the 1980s and 
1990s. This phenomenon expanded the role of madrasas as important academies that issued 
jihadi rhetoric and religious justification of wars under the interests of various state and non-
state actors. Notably, some of the illustrious leaders of radical religious terrorist groups, such 
as Osama bin Laden, Tohir Yoldoshev, Juma Kasimov (better known as Juma Namangani) and 
Ayman al Zawahiri, emerged under the notion of Islamic jihad against Soviet communism. 
Although, the above stated terrorist leaders were not madrasa graduate religious leaders, such 
as Laden, who had graduated from the school of public administration and economics (Coll, 
2004, p. 86), they used madrasa as a tool to disseminate their version of Islamic ideology. 
Significantly, this was not consistently applied to all Islamic madrasas in the region. 
Following the independence of Pakistan, the number of madrasas grew from a couple 
of hundred to thousands (Borchgrevink, 2011, p. 4), even hundreds of thousands if one counts 
the maktabs, which are present within each mosque. Notably, some of these madrasas were 
places to train religiously motivated radical extremists and fighters in the different wars in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan (Bano, 2007, p. 50; Berkey, 2007, p. 490). Since Afghanistan has 
furbished ground for all religiously motivated wars for decades, from the 1970s to the present 
day, this paper will now move on to discuss the importance and potential role of madrasas in 
Afghanistan. 
 
ROLE OF MADRASAS IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Afghanistan was a crossroad for different civilization; dynasties such as the Achaemenids, 
Alexander of Macedon, Baktarians and Kushans came across, conquering the vast lands of the 
Middle East, Central and South Asia (Dupree, 1977, pp. 26-35). Remnants of these civilizations 
formed a heterogeneous society in Afghanistan. Islam arrived in Afghanistan in the 7th century 
and, later, Afghanistan served as home to Islamic empires such as Ghaznaid (10th to 12th 
century) and the Turks of Central Asia, (13th to 14th century) (Singh, 2007, p. 17). Notably, 
during Ghaznavid and Central Asian Turkic rule, cities such as Balkh, Herat and Ghazni had 
become home to some of the best-known madrasas in Islamic history. These madrasas produced 
renowned Muslim theologians, philosophers and poets, such as Hakim Sanai (during the 
Ghaznavid era, 11th century), Khawja Abdullah Ansari and Maulana Jalaludin Rumi, known 
as Jalaludin Balkhi in Afghanistan (13th n century) (Samadi, 2001, p. 25). 
Islam depicts the social, cultural and political identity of Afghan societies. About 80% 
of Afghans belong to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence of the Sunni sect and rest are the 
followers of, mainly, Jafari and Ismaili schools of jurisprudence of the Shia sect (Roy, 1986, p. 




30). These schools of thought, in contrast to Indian and Pakistani schools, were traditionally 
based on the sufi or tasawuf tradition (mystical dimension) of Islam (Roy, 1986, p. 30; 
Giustozzi, 2010, p. 181). Unlike the Deobandi School, sufis, ulema, pirs (holy man) and mullahs 
(also known as mawlawi) had traditionally followed the spiritual path of piety in Afghanistan. 
However, the way in which Islam was understood, preached and expressed was different 
amongst the ulema and mullahs of the different ethnic and tribal groups in Afghanistan. 
According to Roy (1986, pp. 34-35), “[t]hroughout Afghanistan, Islam is far from being a single 
system of norms.” In the context of Islam and its role in Afghan society, it would be pragmatic 
to divide Afghan societies mainly into two regions. First, the tribal regions mainly inhabited by 
Pashtuns, where societies are ruled under a cultural code of law, Pashtunwali (Pashtun 
brotherhood). In these regions role of Muslim clergies and shari’ah were futile (Roy, 1986, p. 
35). Roy explained the difference as: 
The tribal code is more democratic but more restrictive; it does not attempt to transcend 
the particularity of the group, but makes appeal to the consensus of the tribal community. As 
far as political life in Afghanistan is concerned, the tribal code tends to isolate the Pashtun 
community, while the shari’at, which does not recognise that ethnic groups have ultimate 
reality, envisages a more universal social order (Roy, 1986, p. 36). 
Nonetheless, in recent days, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Pashtunwali tradition has changed to what Nabi Misdaq explained as an intertwined religio-
cultural code where three of the fundamental codes of Pashtunwali “are yawalay, monotheism 
or belief in one God; paighamabary, prophethood or belief in the Prophet Muhammad, and 
qiamat/akherat or the day of judgement”, which are, at the same time, the fundamental beliefs 
of Islam (Misdaq, 2006, pp. 30-31). Second, in non-tribal regions, a general framework of law 
is practiced under Shari’ah law. 
Although, since the late 18th century, Afghanistan has gone through different social, 
economic and political changes, madrasas and maktabs have preserved their de facto traditional 
role as centres of education in the contemporary era. Likewise, in India and Pakistan, maktabs 
in Afghanistan instruct basic religious education, such as reading and reciting the Quran or 
memorising it, and madrasas impart higher religious pedagogy. Religious education in 
Afghanistan is divided into two types: Dar ul Hifaz, which instructs memorisation of the Quran, 
and a madrasa, as in Pakistan and India, which imparts higher religious pedagogy 
(Borchgrevink, 2010, p. 16). Madrasas and maktabs were the only source of education in 
Afghanistan until 1920, when King Amanullah introduced a modern Westernised system of 
education into the country (Borchgrevink, 2010, p. 16). However, the state’s role in the 
provision of education to people has remained modest and very limited. Although, the 
“Constitution promulgated (Article 20 and 22) in 1931 made primary education compulsory for 
all Afghans” (Samadi, 2001, p. 29), there were very few or no schools available for Afghan 
children to attend. For example, by 1950, there were only seventeen secondary schools 
established throughout the country (Samadi, 2001, p. 41). Moreover, “[b]y 1940, with an 
estimated population of ten million people, there were 60,000 pupils in 324 schools [, modern 
Westernised,] with 1,990 teachers throughout Afghanistan… [after ten years in 1950 the 
number of students barely reached to] 95,3000” (Samadi, 2001, p. 10). Samadi’s conclusion 
that internal political instability, issues of multi-culturalism and economic restraints were some 
of the main obstacles for the development of education in Afghanistan (Samadi, 2001, p. 9) 




may have been true, but it should also be noted that, during Muhammad Zahir Shah’s rule, 
which lasted for forty years (1933 – 1973), Afghanistan was a peaceful country, particularly in 
its domestic affairs (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 25). Thus, there was little effort to modernise the 
system of education in Afghanistan compared to neighbouring countries in the region. 
In the absence of general schools (state run education), particularly in rural areas, which 
constitute about 80% of the population (Samadi, 2001, p. 14) maktabs and madrasas have 
become the only available centres for education. Which is not to say that madrasas or maktabs 
were the only centres to impart religious education, rather they were “socio-cultural centres” 
(Borchgrevink, 2010, p. 25). Thus, historically, there has been strong association between 
communities and madrasas. In other words, madrasas and maktabi were social and culture 
representatives of villages and localities in rural areas in Afghanistan. Moreover, ulema, sufis, 
mullahs and religious scholars, particularly since the first Afghan-Anglo wars (1838-45), have 
been playing an important role in politics (for example, they played an important role in the 
wars against foreign intrusions as well as in inter-tribal or inter-ethnic wars) and in the process 
of state building in Afghanistan (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 10; Giustozzi, 2010, p. 181). Also, in 
respect to provision of education by madrasas, particularly maktabs, it would be a mistake to 
say that maktabs are generally well-appointed with professional highly skilled ulema, scholars 
of Islamic science or teachers. In fact, mullahs, particularly in the rural areas, are not part of 
any establishment rather they are chosen by the local villagers based on their piety and 
traditionally belonging to a mullah family (Roy, 1986, p. 32). Notably, the mullahs performed 
multi tasks (social and religious), such as leading the five times daily prayers (imam), arbitrators 
whenever there is crisis, conducting marriages, performing burial prayers and imparting Islamic 
education (Roy, 1986, p. 32). 
Given the important role of religion in the social, cultural and political affairs of 
Afghans, the madrasa education system in Afghanistan has developed and been “shaped by 
cultural and political settings” (Borchgrevink, 2010, p. 25). From a political standpoint, 
religious circles in Afghanistan have been playing an important role in shaping not only social 
and political identity, but also playing a key role in leading rebellions, violence under the 
rhetoric of protecting Islam and pan-Islamism. These movements were not limited against 
foreign intrusion. In other words, to protect Islam against infidels; rather they were continuously 
conducting opposition to any state attempt under a modernised Amir (leader) to adopt 
Westernisation. For example, Habibullah Kalkani (known as Bacha-ye Sqqao) a religious 
leader and murid (disciple) of pir Shams – ul Haq Mujaddidi Kohestani led a successful revolt 
against the modernist reforms of King Amanullah (1919–1929) in 1929 and took control of the 
state power and established Islamic shari’ah law in the country (Roy, 1986, pp. 66-67). 
The attempts to develop and modernise the education system led the state to establish 
new schools and madrasas across the country. For example, between 1930 and 1940, the state 
set up new madrasas throughout the country, such as Dar – ul – Ulum Arabia in Kabul, Fakhr 
ul-Madaris in Herat, and Madrasa-I Asadiya in Mazar-I Sharif (Olesen, 1995, p. 187 cited in 
Borchgrevink, 2010, p. 17). These madrasas performed like secondary schools and, for higher 
religious education, the Faculty of Shari’at was established at the University of Kabul in 1951 
(Roy, 1986, p. 45). However, the education development programme did not encompass rural 
areas (Borchgrevink, 2010, p. 22). In remote areas, madrasas and maktabs were built and 
financially supported (collecting zakat and ushr, crop tax, one tenth of the agricultural yield) by 




peasant villagers. Thus, throughout the modern history of Afghanistan most of the community 
in rural areas were stagnated and deprived of basic education services. Since Islam is considered 
‘absolute’ and capable of creating its own jurisdiction, law, education, politics, social and 
cultural identity, without relying on any establishment or state, madrasas and maktabs led by 
unqualified mullahs created a desired version of Islam in rural Afghanistan. As a result, 
unknowledgeable mullahs who are charismatic trustworthy leaders have become useful tools 
for the political and strategic interests of state and non-state bodies. This fact inevitably means 
that the mass population, particularly in rural areas, are potential powers that can be motivated 
under religio-political movements in the cause of different political and strategic interests, such 
as using jihad as a tool to contain Soviet expansion in South Asia. 
Before moving on to the next part, it is important to shed light on the role of religious 
education for Muslim females. Notably, throughout the history of madrasa, there was modest 
improvement for the provision of education for Muslim females in South Asian madrasas. Since 
our purpose under this undertaking is to examine the politicisation of madrasas as tools for the 
policies and strategies of state and non-state organisations, particularly in South Asia, we do 
not examine madrasas under a gender divide. Rather, this study focuses to account for all those 
madrasas, regardless of gender difference, that act as a tool for the policies of state and non-
state forces. This will be discussed in detail in the following part. 
 
MADRASAS: A TOOL FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF STATE 
AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
As stated in the previous sections of this paper, Islam is a religio-political ideology. Thus, states 
throughout history have used religious justification to formulate and plan political and strategic 
interests. Bakircioglu, in his book Islam and Warfare, provides an excellent background to the 
war doctrine from the Islamic perspectives. He stated that, 
Muslim rulers drew on religious justification for politically and/or economically 
motivated wars, largely because this eased the conscience of Muslim warriors, assuring them 
that the cause for which they fought was righteous (Bakircioglu, 2014, p. 46). 
The turning point in the context of religious justification for politically and strategically 
motivated wars in the end of 20st century occurred under the Cold War politics in South Asia. 
In particular, this started with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. The religiously 
motivated war against Soviet infidels predominantly gained ground amongst religious leaders, 
mullahs, ulema and madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In India, on the other hand, this 
movement did not gain popularity amongst Indian Muslims. The most important reason for this 
was that madrasas in India, since its independence in 1947, have generally remained limited to 
the provision of education. Although Indian madrasas played a decisive role in the political 
movements and revolts against the British Raj during the colonial era, they were quick to adopt 
a Western modernised system of education, considering it key to producing the modern Indian 
Muslim, who could compete with Hindu elites and revive Islamic values among the Hindu 
majority India (Rashid, 2001, p. 88). Given the importance of religiously motivated wars in the 
post-Cold War era, there have been a series of allegations by the Indian state and the media that 
Indian madrasas are centres for training religious militancy, particularly after 9/11 (Sikand, 
2004, pp. 140-141). However, Indian madrasas have strongly condemned and denied these 




allegations (Sikand, 2004, pp. 141-142). The Indian madrasas have generally remained 
detached from being a tool for state and non-state strategic and political interests, especially 
under the religiously motivated wars. In this context, Sikand (2004, p. 142), stated that “[t]o 
equate the Indian madrasas with the Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan…is…misleading, for the 
contexts in which they operate are totally different.” In Pakistan and Afghanistan, madrasas 
were used as tools to exert religiously motivated wars against Soviet troops during the 1980s 
and as well as in the Afghan civil wars in the 1990s (Rashid, 2001, pp. 89-91). In contrast, in 
the contemporary era, madrasas in India have remained detached from being a tool for 
politically and strategically motivated movements (Sikand, 2004, p. 143). Since the purpose of 
this article is to examine how madrasas are politicised to serve the political and strategic 
interests of state and non-state groups, contemporary Indian madrasas, in this context, will not 
meet the purpose this research. Consequently, discussion in the rest of the paper will be focused 
on those madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan that serve as tools for the strategic and political 
interests of state and non-state actors. 
In order to control and produce ulemas friendly to the state, the government of 
Afghanistan sought to install the Deobandi system of madrasas education in Afghanistan in 
1933 (Rashid, 2001, p. 88-89). In Afghanistan, unlike Pakistan, where Deobandi madrasas 
formed political parties (Jamiat Ulema – e – Islam and Jamiat – e – Ulema – I – Pakistan), the 
Deobandi madrasas failed to gain approval among Afghan religious circles. In contrast, Afghan 
religious scholars who had attended Al Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt (one of the most 
prestigious Islamic universities in the Islamic world) had become strongly influenced by the 
Egyptian religious radicals, such as Sayyed Qutb (Roy, 1986, p. 70; Coll, 2004, pp. 112-113). 
In this sense, it can be said that the roots of Islamisation in Afghanistan are to be found in the 
tenets of Egyptian Islamic radicals such as Qutb and Hasan al-Banna (founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood). However, the Islamic radicalisation that emerged in the 1970s in Afghanistan 
was formulated under the auspices of Pakistani Deobandi madrasas, which were not solely 
rooted in the narrow ideologies of the Pakistani Deobandi ulema; rather it was a policy tool for 
the clandestine political and strategic interests of different states at regional and international 
levels. 
 One of the renowned Afghan religious leaders, Mawlawi Younus Khalis, a Haqqania 
madrasa graduate (one of the distinguished madrasas, also known as Dar – Ul – Ulum Haqqania, 
located in Akora Khatak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan) who owned madrasas inside 
Afghanistan (Rashid, 2001, p. 84), translated and published Qutb’s work, Islam wa edalat – e 
edjtemay (Islam and social justice) (Roy, 1986, p. 70). Following Khalis, Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, who graduated from the Al- Azhar University and was influenced by Qutb, also 
translated Pointers to the Way (Roy, 1986, p. 70). As a result, Afghan students (in madrasas 
and in the Faculty of Shari’at, University of Kabul) were indoctrinated by Qutb's vision of 
Islam, which stated: 
The function of this Divine system which is given to us- we, who are the callers to 
Islam- is to provide a certain style of thinking, purified from all those Jahili styles [, Western,] 
and ways of thinking which are current in the world and which have poisoned our culture by 
depriving us of our own mind (Qutb, 2001, p. 41). 
This phenomenon fostered affinity between Pakistani Deobandi and Afghan religious 
circles. According to Rashid (2001, p. 86), Pakistani Deobandi madrasas were inspired by an 




Egyptian Islamic organisation, Ikhwan ul Muslimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 
1928 in Egypt). Thus, under the Cold War politics, the Pakistani Deobandi madrasas infiltrated 
Afghan religious circles. Consequently, the Afghan education centres (madrasas, maktabs and 
the University of Kabul) became key to setting up political movements that triggered a series 
of religiously motivated sectarian violence in the country. According to Coll (2004, p. 111) 
students “confronted a choice; communism or radical Islam.” In 1972, religious scholars and 
ulema such as Rabbani and Gholam Niazi (an Azhar graduate), alongside their politico-
religiously motivated students, set up a militant wing of an Islamic movement called Sazman –
I Jawanan –I Musulman (Organisation of Muslim Youth) (Roy, 1986, p. 70). This movement 
embraced madrasas and mosques across the country. In the early 1970s, some of the main 
strongholds of religiously motivated sectarian violence were established in different madrasas 
and mosques throughout Afghanistan, such as Najmulmadares madrasa of Hadda in Jalalabad 
province, and the mosques of Jamal Mina and Pul – I Khishti in Kabul. According to Roy (1986, 
p. 72) madrasas led by local mullahs in Nuristan and Kunar provinces were “the most sectarian 
part of the [Muslim Youth] movement.” Given the religious affinities of Afghans with Islam, 
and, moreover, the autonomous authority of madrasas and mosques over the majority of the 
population in rural areas, the politico-religious movements gained ground across the country. 
According to Rais (1999, p. 3), madrasas played a key role in shaping Afghan political culture, 
which he defines as “[r]igidity, puritanism, glorification of martyrdom, [and] jihad.” This kind 
of phenomenon in Afghanistan fostered a series of political and strategic interests of different 
countries at regional (Pakistan and Iran, including Saudi Arabia) and international levels (the 
US and its allies) during the Cold War. 
A secret plot by the Organization of Muslim Youth to overthrow the communist regime 
was exposed by Afghan security forces, as a result of which Islamists were forced to flee to 
Pakistan (Roy, 1986, p. 76; Saikal, 2004, p. 174). This situation provided Pakistan a remarkable 
strategic window of opportunity to contain Afghanistan’s provocative Pakistan policy, which 
embraced irredentist claims of Pashtunistan, to annex to Afghanistan or to create an independent 
state for Pakistani Pashtuns, as well as the repudiation of the Durand line as an international 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Saikal, 2004, p. 175). The government of Pakistan, 
with the help of its Deobandi religious circles, particularly under the leadership of Maulana 
Fazlur Raham, leader of the Jamiat – e – Ulema Islam party, set up thousands of madrasa along 
the Afghan border. According to Rashid (2001, p. 89) the number of madrasa rose from nine 
hundred in 1971 to eight thousand registered and about twenty-five thousand unregistered 
private madrasas in 1988. In these madrasas, tens of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani students 
were religiously radicalised and trained to fight in Afghan jihad. Rashid stated that: 
Neither teachers nor students [in these madrasa] had any formal grounding in maths, 
science, history or geography. Many of these warriors did not even know the history of their 
own country or the story of the jihad against the Soviets” (Rashid, 2001, p. 32). 
The US, with its own strategic interests under Cold War politics, joined Pakistan’s 
covert war (training and religiously motivating Afghani and Pakistani students to fight against 
the communist regime in Afghanistan) in the late 1970s (Rashid, 2001, p. 18; Coll, 2004, p. 
59). Later, between 1979 and 1980, Saudi Arabia and Iran also joined the Afghan jihad. Each 
supported a different religious school of thought. The former spent millions of dollars 
establishing madrasas advocating Wahhabism (Coll, 2004, pp. 81-88), (a radical Sunni 




movement founded by Muhammad ibn Al-Wahhab, 1703-1792), which denounces sufism and, 
disapproving of the Shia sect, refutes rationality and calls for interpretation of the Quran and 
Sunnah in accordance to the Prophet’s era (Esposito, 1998, pp. 36-37). The latter, on the other 
hand, advocated vis-à-vis by setting up a series of anti-Wahabi Shia madrasas in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan (Roy, 1986, pp. 146-147). As a result, over half a dozen religious Islamic factions 
were created and supported by different state and non-state Islamic charity groups (particularly 
from the Arab Gulf states). Each Islamic faction, aside from being a resisting force against 
Soviet and Afghan communist forces, were conduits for the strategic and political interests of 
regional and international states. For example, the Hizb-I Islami (Islamic Party) faction was led 
by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; Jamiat Islami (Islamic 
Society), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, was supported by Pakistan, Iran and, later India, (during 
the Afghan civil war); Hizb-I Islami Khalish (Islamic Party Khalis), led by Mohammad Younus 
Khalis, was supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan; Ittihad-I Islami (Islamic Union), led by 
Abdulrab Rasul Sayyaf, was mainly supported by Saudi Arabia; and Hizb-I Wahdat Islami 
(Party of Islamic Union ), led by Abdul Ali Mazari, was supported by Iran (Roy, 1986, pp.128-
148; Saikal, 2004, pp. 210-213). The US unilaterally supported all factions through Pakistan’s 
secret service, the ISI (Coll, 2004, pp. 59-70). Each Islamic faction had set up separate 
madrasas; maktabs and universities that instructed mainly religiously motivated jihadi 
pedagogy. The curriculum of these madrasas was designed and developed at the University of 
Nebraska under the auspices of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
(Ashraf, 2012 p.19). Throughout this period, madrasas became conduits leveraging the political 
and strategic interests of regional and international powers. 
With the arrival of Osama bin Laden and his Egyptian counterparts after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, p. 84), a new phase of religious warfare started. In August 
1988, an organisation came to be formed under Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan, called 
“al-Qaeda al-Askariya (The Military Base)” (Jones, 2009, p. 73). Following this, local and 
foreign radical Islamist non-state organisations quickly formed and spread in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Madrasas expanded to embrace thousands of foreign extremist militants and provided 
recruitment bases for the multifaceted religiously motivated wars in the region. One of the 
important developments in this context was al-Qaeda’s call for a ‘World Islamic Front’ in 1998, 
under which jihad became an “individual duty (Far’d al-ayn)” (Jones, 2009, pp. 76- 79). This 
decree transformed the nature of jihad and made it an international Islamic war against the 
West. Local and international non-state radical groups, such as Lashkar-I Taiba and Harakat ul-
Mujahidin, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in association with al-Qaeda, started engaging 
in military operations beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indian Kashmir (Tomsen, 2011, p. 
520). According to Jones (2009, p. 73), Al-Qaeda had “two components”, the short term Jihadi 
embedded in Afghanistan and long term to recruit as permanent members and operate 
internationally. Under the context of ‘World Islamic Front’, al-Qaeda was able to successfully 
launch a series of terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990, the US strategic interests in South 
Asia were accomplished. However, madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan have preserved their 
de facto importance as surrogates to serve the political and strategic interests of Iran, Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia under the ‘new-Cold War’ politics in the region. In Pakistan, Deobandi 
madrasas have established links with non-state Islamist radical groups, which serve Pakistan’s 




interest in both Afghanistan and Kashmir (Withorp and Graff, 2010, pp. 18-19). According to 
Rashid (2001, p. 91), when Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami failed to safeguard the strategic and 
political interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan, the Taliban (students) emerged in 1994 as a new 
politico-religious movement to replace Hizb-I Islami. Saikal (2004, p. 219), called the 
emergence of the politico-religious Taliban movement, “Pakistan’s creeping invasion.” What 
is important to note about the phenomenon of the Taliban is that the madrasa reached its zenith 
as a tool for policies of state and non-state actors in the 21st century. The Taliban were students 
gathered from different madrasas in Pakistan to lead a new politico-religious movement in 
Afghanistan. Thousands of madrasas, including Haqqania Madrasa, from which most of the 
Taliban leadership graduated, have become key to provide recruitment to the Taliban in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan (Rashid, 2001, pp. 91-92; Saikal, 2004, p. 221). 
According to Cassidy, the rhetoric of Jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan is, creed of 
death and destruction, prescribing what to believe about which god and condemning those who 
do not believe it. It relies on illiteracy, tribal mores, and misogyny to construct its myopic 
narrative (Cassidy, 2012, p. 90). 
Assessing the link between education and militancy in Pakistan, Withrop and Graff 
emphasised that “education process and systems are often purposely… manipulated to 
influence conflict dynamic – usually to detrimental effect” (Withorp and Graff, 2010, p. 29). 
Radicalisation of an Islamic society under religio-political interests or instructing individuals 
with a radical and narrow worldview is likely to take hold in regions where education is scarcely 
available or provided under poorly scattered teachers. Over the last four decades, particularly 
since the start of the Afghan jihad, the “[r]eligio-political developments in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan have made the madrasa a vehicle for the promotion not only of sectarian 
worldviews, but also of specific ideologies and political agendas” (Borchgrevink, 2012, p. 78). 
For example, Pakistan used madrasas as a tool for policies to subdue Afghanistan and exert 
strategy to balance Indian hegemony in South Asia. In this context, Pakistan, through madrasa 
policy, is fighting two proxy wars on two fronts, Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir. Although 
the Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, allying with the US-led ‘Global War on 
Terror’, took assertive strict measures to control religious militancy throughout Pakistan, 
Deobandi madrasas remained as an important tool to pursue foreign policy towards Afghanistan 
and India (Cassidy, 2012, p. 75). However, the emergence of new religio-political movements, 
Tehrik – e – Taliban-e Pakistan, (Movement of Students of Pakistan) in 2004 in Pakistan was a 
backlash to Pakistan’s U-turn policy against al-Qaeda and its associate militants in the country. 
Madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan have become variable tools that are capable of meeting 
diverse political and strategic interests by providing the validities of desired interests under 
religious justification. Two of the most important reasons for this kind of situation in the context 
of South Asia are, first, the autonomy of the madrasa, which, according to Sikand (2004, p. 
138), leaves madrasas open to be used by radical extremists and, second, the poetic structure of 
Quranic texts, which, according to Bakircioglu (2014, p. 66), can have ambivalent meaning if 
plainly interpreted. Thus, given the importance of mass uneducated populations with a strong 
affinity towards Islam, in remote areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, under the strong influence 
of unknowledgeable, trustworthy mullahs and ulema, the majority of the Muslims in these 
regions have become easy to be indoctrinated for personal or state or non-state strategic 
interests. According to Ramadan (2009, pp. 23-24) interpretation of Quranic text needs 




professionalism in science, methodology, grammar, semantics and morphology. Since mullahs 
in local mosques and madrasas in rural areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are graduates from 
madrasas with no scientific and out-dated curriculum, their position in local societies as strong 
authoritarian religious leaders leaves the entire village vulnerable to any religio-politically 
motivated movements. 
On the other hand, Iran, a major player seeking for regional hegemony and political 
supremacy, particularly against Saudi Arabia, has been supporting Shia sectarianism in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the same way, non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan and Taliban, use madrasas, maktabs and mosques as centres to 
advocate their mantra of “Islam or death” (Cassidy, 2012, p. 28). The creeds of radical 
movements (state supported or non-state actors) in the contemporary era are not confined to the 
preaching of jihad against infidels, including Christian and Jews; rather, it embraces all those 
Islamic countries or societies that have friendly relations with the West. According to Cassidy 
(2012,p.28), those who reject the extremist version of Islam are “considered apostates, outside 
the realm of Islamist true believers, and subject to all sorts of heinous atrocities.” Consequently, 
it can be said that madrasas change their policies in accordance to the political developments in 
the region. In other words, madrasas are divergent in their discourses under state policies. For 
example, madrasas and mosques advocated jihad against Soviet infidels during the Cold War, 
which later changed into jihad against the West (particularly the US and Israel) and now, in the 
contemporary era, against all those states that are Western allies or have friendly relations with 
the West. In the same way, madrasas justify wars declaring apostate to their rival schools of 
thought. For example, Sunnis apostate Shia and vice versa. Religiously validated wars by 
madrasas against their states fostered the strategic and political interests of regional rival states. 
For example, a religiously motivated war by Tehrik – e – Taliban-e Pakistan, against Pakistan 
serves the foreign policies of Afghanistan and India towards Pakistan. In contrast, Afghan 
Taliban’s contra-state military operations, as well as Lashkar-e Taiba and Harakatu – ul – 
Mujahedin-led insurgencies in Indian-controlled Kashmir, deliver Pakistan’s foreign policy 
interests against Afghanistan and India. Recently, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have accused 
each other of providing sanctuaries for religiously motivated wars against each other. The 
former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Rehman Malik, accused Afghanistan of supporting 
religious radicalism in his country, saying that Afghanistan is providing safe sanctuaries for 
Pakistani Talibans who are fighting against the state of Pakistan (Georgy and Green, 2012, 
n.p.). In the same way, after a series of terrorist attacks in August 2015 in Kabul, Afghanistan, 
that killed tens of people and injured hundreds, the Afghan President, Muhammad Ashraf 
Ghani, said 
I ask the people and government of Pakistan: if a massacre such as the one that occurred 
in Shah Shaheed [,Kabul,] had happened in Islamabad and the perpetrators had sanctuaries in 
Afghanistan, had offices and training centres in our major cities, how would you react? (cited 




The generalisation of madrasas under one uniform school of thought would be untenable. 
However, disregarding the diversity of methods, concepts, curriculum and principles of 




religious education in the contemporary Islamic world, it is important to understand what the 
contemporary roles of madrasas in Muslim societies are. It would be also a mistake to generalise 
madrasas as tools for the foreign policies of different Islamic states. Madrasas roles differ in 
accordance to the political, social, strategic and cultural structure of states. Madrasas, in Islamic 
countries or in Islamic societies in non-Islamic states with relatively peaceful environments, 
such as Malaysia, India, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan or Brunei, are generally centres for religious 
and Islamic scientific education. However, madrasas perform an inevitable political role in 
conflict-prone regions such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have been under the tense 
political and strategic pressure of regional and international powers. Additionally, people in 
both Afghanistan and Pakistan are strongly embedded in cultural and Islamic identities. This 
kind of phenomenon fostered madrasas to play a greater role in the social and political matters 
of the region, in addition to providing education to the people. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have remained as a focal point under state and non-state actors 
since the arrival of Cold War politics in South Asia. As a result, madrasas under religious tenet 
playing a greater role in the social cultural identities of both Afghanistan and Pakistan have 
become an important means to deliver the Cold War policies in the region. Some of the Afghani 
and Pakistani madrasas have turned into key tools to provide religious validation for the foreign 
policies of states as well as to deliver the political and strategic interests of non-state actors. 
Moreover, the decrees of apostate and takfir doctrine through mosques and madrasas in 
contemporary South Asia have made madrasa a variable tool to fit the diverse strategic interests 
of state and non-state actors in the region. In contemporary South Asia, some madrasas are not 
just proxies to deliver state led policies, but also tools to exert suitable agendas for anyone, 
anywhere under any political, religious or other interests. For non-state groups, such as al-
Qaeda, the phenomenon of contemporary jihad is not limited within the boundaries of nation 
states. Such extremist groups proclaim the Western world and secular Islamic states as Jahiliyya 
(ignorance) and urge their followers to fight against Jahili styles and ways of thinking. 
Although, in general, not all madrasas advocate religiously motivated potential violence to 
deliver state policies or non-state strategic interests, a select number of madrasas, in so doing, 
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